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DEFENDANT'S BRIEF ON RE AND
INTRODUCTION
This case is on reman  for "further proceedings" after
reversal by the Su reme Court of the United States of the
August 4, 1987 judgment of the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit against Price Waterhouse.-  
This Court previously found that impermissible factors
had played an "undefined" role in the deferral in 1983 by Price
Waterhouse of a decision on plaintiff's candidacy for admission
to partnership. As determined by the Supreme Court, the issue
on remand is whether, irrespective of those factors,
plaintiff's  considerable problems dealing with staff and
2/
peers"- would have led to the same decision on the Hopkins
1/ Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins. 109 S. Ct. 1775, 1795 (1989);
Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse. 825 F.2d 458 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
2/ 618 F. Supp. 1109, 1120 (D.D.C. 1985).
Price Waterhouse submits that the
3/
partnership candidacy.
record, including this Court's earlier e press findings,
establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that plaintiff's
candidacy for partnership would have been deferred regardless
of her gender. Therefore, on the e isting record, judgment
should be entered for defendant and against plaintiff on the
question of liability.
I
HISTORY OF PREVIOUS PROCEEDINGS
AND BASIS FOR REMAND
This is an action by plaintiff, Ann B. Hopkins, un er
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42
U.S.C. § 2000e, et sea. Plaintiff alleges that her 1982
candidacy for admission to the Price Waterhouse partnership  as
"held for reconsideration the following year" because of her
4/
se .  Plaintiff seeks back pay and an order that she be
made a partner in the Price Waterhouse fir .
This Court rendered its initial decision in this case
in September of 1985 after a four and one-half day court
trial.
3/ This Court also previously found that the decision not to
repropose plaintiff for partner in 1983 was not tainted by any
consideration of her sex. Id. at 1115. That finding was not
appealed. Therefore, that decision is no longer an issue in
this case.
4/ 109 S. Ct. at 1778.
2
Although the Court found that defendant Price
Waterhouse had a legitimate, non-pretextual basis, unrelated to
the plaintiff's sex, for its decision regarding the Hopkins
partnership, it also found that improper sexual stereotyping
had played an intangible role in the decisionmaking process.
Although the Court found that plaintiff had not established
that she would have been elected partner in the absence of that
flaw in the Price Waterhouse process, the Court held that she
was not required to do so: "Once a plaintiff proves that sex
discrimination played a role in an employment decision, the
plaintiff is entitled to relief unless the employer has
demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that the decision
5/
would have been the same absent discrimination."- The Court
concluded that Price Waterhouse had not proven by clear and
convincing evidence that the decision deferring the Hopkins
candidacy would have been the same regardless of her sex and
judgment was rendered for plaintiff on liability.
The Court of Appeals affirmed this Court's decision as
to liability:
[b]ecause Price Waterhouse could not
demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence
that impermissible bias was not the
determinative factor, . . . the District
Court properly found for Hopkins on the
question of liability.
825 F.2d at 472.
5/ 618 F. Supp. at 1120.
3
The Supreme Court reversed the "ju gment against Price
Waterhouse on liability and remand[ed] the case. . . for
further proceedings. ..." 109 S. Ct. at 1795.
The Justices of the Su reme Court were unable to
produce a single opinion to articulate the basis for the
Court's judgment. A plurality of four Justices explained that
although plaintiff's interpersonal relationships "doomed her
bid for partnership" (id. at 1782), the decision to "hold"
plaintiff's candidacy was a product of both permissible and
impermissible considerations. Therefore, Price Waterhouse
would be liable unless "it can prove that, even if it had not
taken gender into account, it would have come to the same
decision regarding [Ann Hopkins]." Id. at 1786. In other
words, according to the plurality opinion. Price Waterhouse may
not be held liable for the Hopkins decision if it demonstrated
that it was motivated by a "legitimate reason" which, "standing
alone, would have induced it to make the same decision." Id.
at 1792.
Justice White's concurring opinion declared that Price
Waterhouse was entitled to prevail if it could prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that "'it would have reached the
same decision. . . in the absence of" an unlawful motive. I .
at 1795 (citation omitted). Justice O'Connor's concurring
opinion stated that Price Waterhouse would not be liable if it
could show by a preponderance of the evidence "that it would
have reached the same decision. . . absent consideration
of. . . gender." Id. at 1796.
4
All of the Justices rejected the principle that Price
Waterhouse ha  the burden of proving by "clear and convincing"
evidence that its legitimate reason for the Hopkins decision
would have produced the same result even if the improper
factors were removed from the e uation. The plurality and the
two concurring Justices agreed that the law required only that
Price Waterhouse meet its burden by a "preponderance" of the
evidence. The case was remanded so "that that determination
can be made." Id. at 1793.
II
PROCEEDINGS ON REMAND
From the foregoing, it is apparent that this Court's
responsibility on remand is essentially twofold:
1. To Determine Liability
Price Waterhouse has no liability to Ann Hopkins if
her partnership candidacy would have been deferred for
reconsideration regardless of her gender. While this Court was
not previously persuaded that Price Waterhouse had proven by
clear and convincing evidence that its decision would have been
the same, this Court did not determine that Price Waterhouse
had not proved that fact by a preponderance of the evidence.
Indeed, despite the finding of intangible flaws in the process.
5
the Court concluded that plaintiff had not proved that "she
would have been elected to partnership if the Policy Board's
ecision had not been tainted. ..." 618 F. Supp. at 1120.
Price Waterhouse contends that the existing recor 
amply demonstrates that Ann Hopkins, regardless of her sex,
ould not have become a partner in 1982-83 and that the Court
should enter judgment for Price Waterhouse on liability. This
point will be addressed in part A of the following segment of
this brief.
2. If Necessary. To Determine the Appropriate Reme y
If the Court were to conclude that Price Waterhouse
has not established by a preponderance of the evidence that the
Hopkins partnership candidacy would have been deferred
regardless of her sex, then the Court would have to consider
the appropriate remedy. That issue will be discussed only
briefly in part B of this brief because consideration of an
appropriate remedy would not be necessary if the Court decides
in favor of Price Waterhouse on the question of liability.
6
A. Liabili y
1. Price Wa erhouse's Evidentiary Burden On The
"Same Decision" Issue Is Substantially Less Than The "Clear and
Convincin " Burden Previously Imposed.
This Court and the Court of Appeals previously viewed
Price Waterhouse's burden on the "same decision" issue as one
that could be discharged only by "clear and convincing"
evidence. That standard of proof has been variously described
by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit as
6/ 7/"extraordinary and difficult "- "a very high burden,
Q /
"quite substantial,   and "much higher than 'mere
9/preponderance of the evidence.'"  The Supreme Court
referred to it in this case as a "heavy burden." 109 S. Ct. at
1783. Up to this point in this litigation, the Court has
determined only that the evidence that the deferral of
plaintiff s candidacy  ould have occurred regardless of her
gender was not sufficient to overcome this "extraordinary and
difficult" obstacle.
6/ Tonev v. Block. 705 F.2d 1364, 1366 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
7/ Milton v. Weinberger. 696 F.2d 94, 99 n.14 (D.C. Cir.
1982) .
8/ Trout v. Lehman. 702 F.2d 1094, 1107 (D.C. Cir. 1983),
vacated on other grounds. 465 U.S. 1056 (1984).
9/ Collins Securities Coro, v. Securities and Exchange
Commission. 562 F.2d 820, 824 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
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In contrast, the preponderance of the evi ence
standard has been described as the "rock bottom at the
fact-finding level of civil litigation."   Preponderance of
the evidence simply requires that a party prove that a fact is
more likely true than not true. According to standard jury
instructions:
[T]he party with this burden of proof need
prove no more than a preponderance. So long
as. . . the scales tip, however slightly, in
favor of the party with this burden of proof
that what the party claims is more likely
true than not true   then that element will
have been proved by a preponderance of
evidence.
3 L. Sand, J. Siffert, J. Sexton & J. Thorpe, Modern Federal
Jury Instructions. If 73.01 (1989).
This Court has already determined that the
preponderance of the evidence in this case does not establish
that Ann Hopkins woul  have made partner had impermissible
considerations been absent from the decisionmaking process:
Because plaintiff had considerable problems
dealing with staff and peers, the Court
cannot say she would have been elected to
partnership if the Policy Board's decision
had not been tainted by se ually biased
evaluations.
618 F. Supp. at 1120.
10/ Charlton v. Federal Trade Commission. 543 F.2d 903, 907
(D.C. Cir. 1976).
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Thus, the Court has already determined that the
evidence at trial did not tip the scales in plaintiffs favor
on this issue. Unless the evidence was perfectly balanced on
the "same decision" question, the evidentiary scales must a
fortiori be tipped in Price Waterhouse's favor. Therefore,
without any further review of the evidence, the Court may
proceed to determine that Price Waterhouse met its burden on
that issue by a preponderance of the evidence. However, if
further review of the existing record is necessary, the Court
will find ample additional evidence to support the conclusion
that the Hopkins partnership candidacy would have been deferred
regardless of her gender.
2. The E istin  Record Demonstrates By A
Preponderance Of The Evidence That Price Waterhouse Would Have
Deferred Ann Hopkins' 1982 Candidacy For Partnership Regardless
Of Her Sex.
The Court has already reached and announced
certain findings of fact that are or should be dispositive of
the issue before this Court on remand. These findings " 
include the following:
11/ These and additional Proposed Findings of Fact are being
filed concurrently herewith.
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a. Price Waterhouse routinely re uired that
successful partnership applicants demonstrate the ability to
relate properly with collea ues and subordinates within the
Price Waterhouse partnership.
(i) "Price Waterhouse has consistently sought to
maintain the tra itional characteristics of
a professional partnership both in its
management and partnership selection
practices." 618 F. Supp. at 1111.
(ii) "[Price Waterhouse] has consistently placed
a high premium on candidates' ability to
deal with subordinates and peers on an
interpersonal basis and to promote cordial
relations within a firm which is necessarily
dependent on team effort." Id. at 1116.
(iii) "The interpersonal skills of prospective
partners was properly an important part of
Price Waterhouse's written partnership
evaluation criteria. Inability to get along
with staff or peers is a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for refusing to
admit a candidate to partnership." Id. at
1114.
(iv) "[C]andidates [are] re ularly held because
of concerns about their interpersonal
skills." Id. at 1116 (emphasis added).
b. Plaintiff had severe shortcomin s in her
ability to relate professionally to colleagues and subordinates
within the Price Waterhouse organization.
(i) "[P]laintiff had considerable problems
dealing with staff and peers. ..." Id. at
1120.
(ii) "Even supporters of the plaintiff viewed her
style as somewhat offensive and detrimental
to her effectiveness as a manager." Id.
(iii) "Staff members who testified on the
plaintiff's behalf indicated that. . . it
required 'diplomacy, patience and guts' to
work with [plaintiff]." Id. at 1114.
(iv) "Supporters and opponents of her candidacy
indicated that she was sometimes overly
aggressive, unduly harsh, difficult to work
with and impatient with staff." Id. at 1113.
11
c. Price Wa erhouse's decision to hold
plaintiff's candidacy for a mission to the partnership for
r  onsid ration the followin  year was supported by le itimate
non-pretextual considerations unrelated to her sex.
(i) "It is clear that the complaints about
plaintiff's interpersonal skills were not
fabricate  as a pretext for
discrimination. ..." I . at 1114.
(ii) "Plaintiff's conduct provi e  ample
justification for the complaints that formed
the basis of [Price Waterhouse's]
ecision." I .
(iii) Plaintiff received "more 'no' votes than all
but two of the 88 can i ates [in 1982].
These no votes and negative comments. . .
effectively placed the plaintiff toward the
bottom of the candidate pool. Regardless of
its wisdom, the firm's practice of giving
'no* votes great weight treated male and
female candidates in the same way." Id. at
1116.
12
d. Price Waterhouse had le itimate.
nondiscriminatorv r asons to distinguish between plaintiff and
the successful male candidates with whom she compared herself.
(i) "The contemporaneous records generated by
the partnership selection procedure
demonstrate that Price Waterhouse had
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for
distinguishing between the plaintiff and the
male partners with whom she compares
herself." Id. at 1115.
(ii) "The Court finds that the plaintiff has not
provided sufficient proof to demonstrate
disparate treatment based on these
candidates." Id. at 1115 n.6.
The foregoing findings already made by the Court make
it inescapably clear that interpersonal relationships
constitute an important and legitimate partnership
consideration at Price Waterhouse and that this standard was
applied by Price Waterhouse equally to men and women. It is
equally undeniable that Ann Hopkins had substantial problems
with interpersonal relationships. Thus, defendant's evaluation
of plaintiff's relationships with others was legitimate,
serious, and well-founded in fact. The plaintiff was perceived
13
I
by partners and staff members alike to be abrasive, overly
critical of others and intolerant with her staff and her
colleagues. Even the plaintiff "agreed with many of these
criticisms." 618 F. Supp. at 1114. In summary, there is no
room to dispute that plaintiff, regardless of considerations of
gender, failed a central and appropriate Price Waterhouse
partnership test.
It is important to the Court's evaluation of the
Hopkins partnership decision to keep the context in focus. The
Price Waterhouse decision under review was not a rejection of
Ann Hopkins' candidacy for partnership. It was not a final
decision eliminating her opportunity to advance to partner. In
fact, the decision under review was a decision a ainst
foreclosing options by denying her a partnership. The only
Price Waterhouse decision before this Court was the one that
avoided sounding a death knell to her partnership ambitions.
It gave her another opportunity to address the legitimate and
self-acknowledged objections that had been raised in an area of
established and appropriate concern to Price Waterhouse.
It is evident from these facts that a preponderance of
the evidence admitted at trial demonstrates that regardless of
plaintiff's gender, the most her record warranted in 1983 was a
decision to defer her candidacy to permit further growth and
re-evaluation. The decision to hold the Hopkins candidacy  as
logical, supported by ample evidence and, on scrutiny, a fair
and reasonable course for the Price Waterhouse partnership to
14
select at the time and on the record as it e isted in 1983
irrespective of her sex.
Price Waterhouse viewed a decision to admit a
candidate to the partnershi  as similar to a grant of tenure.
Tr. at 345-47. A favorable partnership decision was one that
12/
could be undone only with the greatest difficulty. 
Accordingly, the Firm's Policy Board exercised caution and
"regularly held" even highly qualified candidates who, as this
Court found with respect to plaintiff, had "considerable
problems dealing with staff and peers."   Indeed, the
record contains examples of male candidates who were as highly
regarded as plaintiff in the areas of technical skills,
business generation, and dedication to the Firm, but who were
either placed on hold or rejected outright because of
interpersonal problems equivalent to or even less pronounced
12/ Tr. at 345-47. As Mr. Coffey stated:
We have a partnership that is such that once
one becomes a partner it takes 75 percent of
the partners' own votes to have the partner
excluded from the partnership, so in a sense
we have a kindred situation in Price
Waterhouse. One of the great risks of
admitting partners to our firm is that, one,
they re less supervised and secondly, they
are more tenured and therefore people that
have a likelihood of potential of abusing
authority can cause serious longterm
problems for the firm.
13/ During the period 1980-84, thirty-three candidates were
held or refused admission for reasons concerning their
interpersonal skills. Sixteen were admitted in later years.
Def. Ex. 64 & Def. Ex. 69.
15
than plaintiff's. See Def. Ex. 64. The Appendix filed
concurrently with this brief summarizes the records of several
such candidates.
For example, the first individual described in the
Ap endix had demonstrated skills as an auditor that  ere held
in high esteem by virtually all the Price Waterhouse partners
with whom he had worked. See Def. Ex. 64, Tab 24. The
partners also noted, however, that he had "a history of being
tough and dogmatic to the point of causing periodic problems in
working with staff and clients." The member of the Admissions
Committee responsible for summarizing this candidate's file
explained:
The principal recurring negative appears to
be a very high level of aggressiveness which
sometimes tends to translate into dogmatism,
a tendency not to consider the views of
others, and a tendency to get himself in an
adversary relationship unnecessarily. The
severity of this matter has tended to
diminish over the years but it is
nevertheless present from his early senior
days to the present. It is interesting that
many different evaluators have noticed this
negative trait including people without
prior knowledge of [him] . . . .-14/
These concerns about this candidate's personality were
similar to the concerns expressed about plaintiff. Both were
14/ As noted above, a more complete summary of this
candidate's file as well as the files of several other male
candidates whose profiles were similar to plaintiff's are set
forth in the Appendix to this brief. The candidate described
above was admitted to the partnership in 1984.
16 -
placed on hol  as a result of their  roblems in their dealings
with others, notwithstanding the fact that their other skills
were recognized and valued.
The record before this Court thus proves that Price
Waterhouse treated male and female candidates with deficient
interpersonal skills equally. The plaintiff did not and coul 
not prove otherwise. After reviewing the records of almost 135
candidates proposed during the three year period 1982-84, the
plaintiff could point to only two candidates admitted in the
. . 15/
face of material criticism of their interpersonal skills.
This Court found that the circumstances of those two candidates
were fundamentally different from those presented by the
plaintiff and that peculiar circumstances justified their
admission to partnership despite their problems.
15/ During the three years 1982 through 1984, Price Waterhouse
elected 135 new partners through its partnership selection
process. Def. Ex. 77. Plaintiff was provided in discovery the
evaluative comments made by partners and by the Admissions
Committee on each of these 135 partner candidates. The
plaintiff's earlier pleadings and this Court's findings reflect
that only two of these 135 successful candidates received
material criticism of their interpersonal skills. Plaintiff's
Post-Trial Brief at 20; 618 F. Supp. at 1115 & n.6.
16/
The contemporaneous records. . . demonstrate
that Price Waterhouse had legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reasons for distinguishing
between the plaintiff and the male partners
with whom she compares herself.
. . . [P]laintiff has identified two
[Footnote continued on next page]
17
17/
As noted above,  ecisions to hold were common  and
were not viewed as a rejection or a denial of partnership.
Connor Dep. at 54. More often than not candidates who were
18/
held were eventually admitted to the Firm. A decision to
defer a final and irreversible decision to reject or admit is a
rational, fair, and prudent manner in which to handle an
otherwise qualified candidate with interpersonal skills
problems. That was the course of the Hop ins candidacy and
that was the course experienced by male candidates with similar
problems. The decision was the same regardless of gender.
16/ [Footnote continued from previous page]
[successful] male candidates who were
criticized for their interpersonal skills
because they were perceived as being
aggressive, overbearing, abrasive or
crude. . . . [I]n both cases the Policy
Board e  ressed substantial reservations
about the candidates' interpersonal skills
but ultimately made a "business decision" to
admit the candidates because they had skills
which the firm had a specific, special need
and the firm feared that their talents might
be lost if they were put on hold. In one
case the Policy Board rejected a "hold"
reco mendation by the Admissions Committee
1 because of business considerations. In
| addition, these candidates received fewer
I evaluations from partners reco mending that
| they be denied partnership and the negative
| comments on these candidates were less
I intense than those directed at the plaintiff.
t
618 F. Supp. at 1115 (footnote omitted).
17/ "[C]andidates [are] regularly held because of concerns
about their interpersonal skills." 618 F. Supp. at 1116.
18/ Eighty percent (sixteen out of twenty) of the candidates
held in 1983 (plaintiff's year) were eventually admitte  to thr
partnershi . Def. Ex. 69.
18
B. Remedy
It provi es context to the liability decision to
observe that irrespective of the outco e of the "same decision"
defense, plaintiff is not entitled to an order that Price
Waterhouse make her a partner. Such an order would constitute
an extraordinary remedy, well beyond the creation of a simple
employment relationship, and an exercise of equitable powers
not clearly available to the Court under these circumstances.
It would directly, substantially and intimately affect the
interests of individuals who plainly did not discriminate
against plaintiff. It would be particularly inappropriate to
force Price  aterhouse partners to accept into a professional
and collegial partnership someone who suffered from an
"[i]nability to get along with staff or peers." 618 F. Supp.
at 1114. This Court, in the exercise of its equitable
discretion, should not force onto this organization an
individual who is an acknowledged disruptive and abrasive
factor.
Even a plaintiff who prevails on the issue of
liability has no legal entitlement under Title VII to remedies
such as backpay or admission to a partnership. The Court of
Appeals for this Circuit has determined that "a plaintiff whose
right to protection from discrimination has been violated still
may be denied a full remedy." Milton v. Weinberger,
696 F.2d 94, 98-99 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (court s emphasis) (citing
19
Smith v. Secretary of Navy, 659 F.2d 1113, 1120 (D.C. Cir.
1981)). "[I]n Title VII cases 'the questions of statutory
violation and appropriate statutory remedy are conceptually
distinct.'  Johnson v. Brock. 810 F.2d 219, 223 (D.C. Cir.
1987) (quoting Smith v. Secretary of Navy, supra, at 1120).
The remedial phase of a Title VII case is an
essentially equitable proceeding. There are no
automatic or mandatory remed[ies]....
The [statutory] scheme implicitly recognizes
that there may be cases calling for one
remedy but not another, and. . . these
choices are, of course, left in the first
instance to the district courts.
Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moodv. 422 U.S. 405, 415-16 (1975).
This Court's responsibility certainly does not extend
beyond placing plaintiff into the position she would have
occupied had the Price Waterhouse partnership process been
found to be flawless. If so, plaintiff would have been in the
position of a candidate evaluated without regard to her sex.
That is the most favorable position to which she may be
restored by any remedial order of this Court. Plaintiff is not
entitled to be placed in a more favorable position than she
would have occupied absent the perceived "taint" of se 
stereotyping. In fact. Title VII specifically provides that a
plaintiff cannot rely upon mere proof of some undefined "taint"
in a multi-stage decisional process to achieve a more favorable
position than she would have been in had there been no taint of
20
discrimination. See. e.q.. Bibbs v. Block. 778 F.2  1318 (8th
Cir. 1985) (en banc); see also Mt. Healthy City School
District v. Dovle. 429 U.S. 274, 285-86 (1977).
In similar cases, in which a plaintiff has been held
to have established that discrimination had some elusive and
unquantifiable connection with a promotion decision, but the
employer had also established legitimate reasons to question
the qualification of the plaintiff for the promotion in
question, the plaintiff has been given no more than
reconsideration for the promotion in a nondiscriminatory
selection process. As in the instant litigation, many of those
cases involved multi-stage decisional processes and promotions
that included elements of tenure. See Gurmankin v. Costanzo,
626 F.2d 1115 (3d Cir. 1980), cert, denied. 450 U.S. 923
(1981); Pvo v. Stockton State Colle e. 603 F. Supp. 1278
(D.N.J. 1985); Gemmell v. Meese. 655 F. Supp. 577 (E.D. Pa.
1986); Fields v. Clark University, 40 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 670
(D. Mass. 1986), rev'd. 817 F.2d 931 (1st Cir. 1987); see also
Darnell v. City of Jasper. 730 F.2d 653, 656 (11th Cir. 1984)
(plaintiff held entitled to participate in test that had been
unlawfully denied, but not to be placed in position).
21
CONCLUSION
As the extensive findings alrea y made by the Court
demonstrate, and as is otherwise amply established by the
record. Price Waterhouse had substantial legitimate reasons not
to grant  laintiff a position of tenure in its professional
partnership. Those reasons were more than adequate, standing
alone, to justify deferring a decision on the Hopkins candidacy
in 1983. The record shows that no male candidate would have
been admitted to the Price Waterhouse partnership under
comparable circumstances.
Price Waterhouse has established by a preponderance of
the evidence that any deficiencies that may have existed in its
partnership decisionmaking process in 1982 and 1983 do not
provide the explanation for the decision that resulted in
22
Thatholding the plaintiff's can idacy to a future date,
decision would have been the same regardless of her gender.
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